Mu'tazila and Shīʿa (Zaydiyya-Imāmiyya) have common views on many theological issues except the imamate. This issue has been generally accepted by other Islamic scholars rather than Shīʿa and by Western researchers. That in this interaction between the Mu‘tazila and the Shīʿa, the Shīʿa is the side mostly affected. However, it is an issue that should not be overlooked that the Shīʿa partially influenced the Mu'tazila in ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, over the other Companions. In this context, some persons from the (...) Baghdad Mu’tazila School such as Bishr b. al-Muʿtamir (d. 210/825), Jaʿfar b. Mubashir (d. 234/848), Jaʿfar b. Harb (d. 236/850) and al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854) argued that the imamate of Abū Bakr, who was less virtuous, was permissible although they considered ʿAlī as the most virtuous person after the Prophet. In addition, al-ʿAllāf (d. 235/849-850), al-Naẓẓām (d. 231/845), Abū Abdullah al-Basrī (d. 369/979-80) and Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) along with Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916), one of the chiefs of the Basra Mu'tazila School, and Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933) did not accept the order of caliphate as the order of virtue. This study focuses on the issue of whether the aforementioned affinity between Mu'tazila and Shīʿa affected Mu'tazila, especially in the interpretation of the verses associated with ʿAlī. In the study, the aforementioned problem was examined through the tafsīr al-Kashshāf of the Muʿtazilī mufassir al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144). In addition to the importance of tafsīr, the fact that al-Zamakhsharī took lessons from Shīʿīte/Zaydī persons and he wrote the tafsīr with the support of Zaydī leader al-Wahhās (d. 506/1112) is effective in handling this issue through al-Kashshāf's tafsīr. In the first part of the study, first of all, the interaction between Imāmiyya and Zaydism, which are the two most important branches of Mu‘tazila and Shīʿa, is briefly mentioned. Then, Mu'tazila’s and Al-Zamakhsharī’s view on ʿAlī's position among other caliphs is emphasized. Al-Zamakhsharī, who is from the Basra school of the Mu'tazila, does not consider ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib superior to Abū Bakr, unlike al-ʿAllāf, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī, Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī and Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, who are the leading figures of this school. In fact, the fact that he always observed the order of the caliphate while talking about the merits of the four caliphs supports the possibility that, unlike his predecessors, he accepted the order of the caliphate as the order of virtue. In the second part, it is questioned whether the narrations that al-Zamakhsharī included in his tafsīr of the verses associated with ʿAlī are similar to the narrations of the Shīʿīte/Zaydī/Imāmī tradition and whether he interpreted the verses in parallel with these narrations. In this respect, the tafsīr al-Kashshāf has been examined comparatively with the Sunni and Shiite tafsīrs prior to it. Eventually, while interpreting these verses associated with the Ahl al-bayt (members of the Prophet’s household), al-Zamakhsharī highlights the narrations that appreciate the virtues of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and his child. However, he also refrains from making comments that would be in line with the Shīʿa's belief in imamate. In particular, his tafsīr of the verse al-Aḥzāb 33/33 in the context of the Prophet’s wives is the greatest indicator of this situation. It has been determined that while al-Zamakhsharī includes the narrations highlighting the virtue of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and his children, he mostly follows the Sunni commentator al-Thaʿlabī. In particular, it has been seen that al-Zamakhsharī transferred the narration material in the interpretation of the relevant verses from al-Thaʿlabī's commentary almost in the same way. However, it is noteworthy that al-Zamakhsharī differs from him in some details such as linguistically supporting these narrations in some verses such as ʾĀli ʿImrān 3/61 and al-Māʾidah 5/55. An indirect influence can be mentioned because al-Thaʿlabī frequently narrates the narrations supporting the Shīʿītes in places where there is a Sunni-Shīʿīte conflict. Therefore, although there is no evidence that al-Zamakhsharī took these narrations from Shīʿīte sources, it is seen that he brought ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib-based narrations in Sunni sources into the fore. Even in the commentary of al-Ḥākim al-D̲h̲us̲h̲amī, al-Zamakhsharī's teacher in the line of Zaydi/Mu'tazili, the lack of Ali emphasis in the interpretation of the aforementioned verses supports our view. (shrink)

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind” and Bergson’s Matière et mémoire and “La perception du changement,” I ask what resources are available in vision for interrupting objectifying habits of seeing. While both Bergson and Merleau-Ponty locate the possibility of seeing differently in the figure of the painter, I develop by means of their texts, and in dialogue with Iris Marion Young’s work, a more general phenomenology of hesitation that grounds what I am calling “critical-ethical vision.” Hesitation, I argue, stems from (...) affect and leads to critical memory. In hesitation, the seeming coincidence between my habits of seeing and the visible is decentered, revealing these habits and their social reference as the constitutive horizon of my field of vision. Hesitation, then, provides the phenomenological moment within which vision may become at once critically watchful, destabilizing its objectifying habits, and ethically responsive, recollecting its affective grounds. The critical and the ethical are here inseparable. Critically, this vision is an awareness of the structures of invisibility, diacritical and habitual, social and historical, to which my vision owes—dimensions which institute particular ways of seeing and being as norm while eliding others. Ethically, this is the recognition of how seeing is already seeing with others—others whose affective influence is operative within vision, even as their existence is reductively represented or denied. (shrink)

In al-Kindi's treatise On First Philosophy, he advances three arguments in favour of the temporal origination of the universe. In this paper, I shall be concerned only with the first of these, namely, the argument based on the necessary concomitance of body, motion, and time. I shall argue that it does not appear to successfully establish that theuniverse began toexistin tempore. Inthecourse of discussion, however, it will become clear that I am not persuaded that recent set theoretic criticisms of this (...) argument are cogent. My conclusion, nevertheless, will be that one is not rationally justified in inferring that the universe was created by God ex nihilo in the finite past on the basis of this argument. (shrink)

Die Reihe Islamkundliche Untersuchungen wurde 1969 im Klaus Schwarz Verlag begr ndet und hat sich zu einem der wichtigsten Publikationsorgane der Islamwissenschaft in Deutschland entwickelt. Die ber 330 B nde widmen sich der Geschichte, Kultur und den Gesellschaften Nordafrikas, des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens sowie Zentral-, S d- und S dost-Asiens.

Die Reihe Islamkundliche Untersuchungen wurde 1969 im Klaus Schwarz Verlag begründet und hat sich zu einem der wichtigsten Publikationsorgane der Islamwissenschaft in Deutschland entwickelt. Die über 330 Bände widmen sich der Geschichte, Kultur und den Gesellschaften Nordafrikas, des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens sowie Zentral-, Süd- und Südost-Asiens.

This commentary seeks to clarify the potential discrepancy between lab-based and field data in the use and effectiveness of punishment to promote cooperation by recommending theory that outlines key differences between the lab and field, such as the shadow of the future and degree of information availability. We also discuss a recent meta-analysis (Balliet et al. 2011) that does not support all conclusions outlined in Guala's target article.

In Islamic theological writings, under the heading of sustenance, the focus is generally on issues such as who is the provider of sustenance, whether haram is considered sustenance, and whether Allah’s consent exists for haram sustenance. Another issue that can be found between the lines of the subject of sustenance is whether it is haram for a person to work for sustenance or not. In fact, the pursuit of means of livelihood in order to sustain one’s life is, according to (...) the general and predominant acceptance of Muslim scholars, permissible and, in cases of necessity, wajib. According to a record in Uṣūl al-niḥal, during the formative period of itizālī thought, there were Mu‘tazilite sufis (ṣūfiyyat al-Muʿtazila) such as Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir’s disciple Abū Imrān Mūsā b. al-Raqqāshī, al-Naẓẓām’s apostate disciple Fadl al-Hadathī, and Husayn al-Kūfī, about whom no information is available. These names, who seem to have earned their livelihood through almsgiving, defended the forbiddenness (taḥrīm al-makāsib) of all kinds of endeavour for sustenance, contrary to the acceptance of Muslim thinkers. However, it should be noted that for them, the forbiddenness in making an effort for sustenance does not cover the definition of sustenance, which is ‘all the benefits’, but only the effort in obtaining sustenance through means such as trade and agriculture. It is interesting to find such an extreme tendency among the Mu‘tazilites, who came to the fore with their rationalist discourses. “How could a Mu‘tazilite defend tahrīm al-makāsib?”, the issue of abandonment of striving for sustenance (tark al-makāsib), from which the idea of tahrīm al-makāsib is thought to have evolved, is mentioned, and then the Mu‘tazilite sufis views on tahrīm al-makāsib are tried to be based mainly on Mu‘tazilite sources and the criticisms of Mu‘tazilite authors against them are included. It has been determined that Mu‘tazilite sufis justifications for defending tahrīm al-makāsib concentrate on three points: (i) the absence of a just order due to the absence of a just imam and the possibility of supporting the oppressors (rulers) intentionally or unintentionally, and as a result of this, some of them describe the land of Islam as dār al-kufr, (ii) again in relation to the issue of imamate, in an environment where there is no justice, i.e. legal/moral order, the halāl and harām are so intertwined that they cannot be separated from each other, and in order to protect oneself from harām, the things that are subject to sustenance can only be purified through charity and become halāl, and (iii) the fact that trust in Allah is obligatory and any effort to pursue sustenance is contrary to tawakkul. The Mu‘tazilite authors criticised the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib on the grounds that it is permissible to trade while maintaining a rational and ethical attitude, that one’s intention and interest in trade are important, and that tawakkul cannot be built on the right ground. As a result, the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib disappeared because they could not gain a foothold in the Mu‘tazilite intellectual climate due to their erroneous reasoning. (shrink)

The simple fact is every utterance has the potential to offend. The issue pursued in this paper is not whether a joke is ethically correct or ethically objectionable. Rather, the issue is, how is it possible that an utterly tasteless joke, a joke that many consider to be crude, rude, inappropriate, highly offensive and even harmful be considered to be funny? Even though I will argue that given the right context, the right audience, any joke can be considered funny, I (...) am not saying that they are acceptable, correct, or ethical. The issue here is an epistemic one and not normative. Depending upon who's telling the joke and the audience to whom it's told, ethnic and racial jokes can either prove to be delightful and delicious or dehumanizing and disgusting. However, I want to point out that good ethnic humor need not and should not be this way. (shrink)

With regard to the new directions in the Humanities, here I am going to consider and examine the approach of al-Farabi as a medieval thinker in introducing a new outlook to “language” in difference with the other views. Thereby, I will explore his challenges in the frame of “philosophical humanism” as a term given by Arkoun (1970) and Kraemer (1984) to the humanism of the Islamic philosophers and their circles, mainly in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Al-Farabi’s conception of philosophical (...) humanism, in which philosophy is thick and religion is thin, makes its agony with the other versions of humanism and also orthodox Islam. It means that his introduction of a humanistic understanding of language should be placed in such a multi-level contested environment. According to al-Farabi, language as a universal category has relation with reason that logic should function as its proper instrument. As a result, there is no specific privileged predetermined language, but the position of any language is shaped by its relation with human reason and formal logic that is something human-made. And such a conception means language in human terms. Key Terms: Al-Farabi; Language; Philosophical Humanism; Arabic: Greek . (shrink)

Research papers, chiefly on ancient Indic philosophy, and a few on Indian civilization.

This article discusses Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām’s (d. 231/845) (one of the first Muʽtazilī thinkers); understanding of Allah-world relationship, his theory of nature (tab‘) and his view on miracles. In a proposal form, Muʽtazilī scholars accept that the miracle, which is the actual confirmation, must occur, since it is not possible for Allah to confirm His messenger (prophet) in a way that everyone can hear and in a direct word. Since the Prophet's message can be authenticated only by a miracle, Muʽtazilī (...) thinkers paid great attention to this issue, organized and formed natural theories about the universe in a way that miracles can occur. Naẓẓām explains a kind of miracle that occurs under the power of Allah, by his theory of nature called latency and occurrence (kumūn-ẓuhūr). His view of miracles is rooted in the Muʽtazilī classification of miracles. Naẓẓām argues that in the theory of nature, things are infinitely divided. He also argues that all qualities considered accident (aʽrāḍ) by other Muslim theologians are different objects as only motion and rest are the only accidents. According to him, the universe consists of objects and accidents of motion only. In each object in the universe, an unlimited number of opposing objects (sub-components) that have different effects on each other is located in the same space. Those objects in the same space are intervened (tadākhul) with each other. Kumūn refers to sub-components that are located inside the object in a state of passing into each other, and a state of balancing each other through the push-pull motion (i‘timād). Ẓuhūr is an outward movement of the sub-component from where it is located when an impact imposed outside the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in it. Naẓẓām says that too many opposing sub-components, such as heaviness-lightness, heat-coldness contained in the object, form an internal dynamic by providing balancing each other through inside the object with the push-pull motion. The state of balance inside the object is disrupted by an external factor affecting one of the sub-components. An external thing approaching the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in the object. Then, the affected sub-component moves out of the object and thus the state of balance inside the object is disrupted. According to the theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, change in objects occurs when the balance within the object is disturbed. The change in the balance also occurs not by the direct intervention of Allah and the creation of accidents, but by the disruption in the balance of natures within the object. Naẓẓām, who advocates the intrinsic natures in things, has been criticized for not leaving any room for Allah’s influence on objects at least through miracles. This criticism is not correct. Naẓẓām says that the nature of objects depends on God, and it is possible for God to intervene in them at any time. According to him, Allah can force opposing objects into a union that is not in their natures. In their natures, unification can separate those by applying pull and push. In this way, Naẓẓām sees the intervention of Allah as possible in the occurrence of a situation that is the opposite of what is present in the nature of objects. In Naẓẓām's theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, there are suppressed natures and sub-components that are in a weak state inside the actual object. Furthermore, they cannot go out in any way from the actual object. One of these suppressed natures found in the object is removed from the nature of the object by the intervention of Allah when a miracle occurs in the hands of theProphet. In this case, the miracle is not something new that Allah has created, but that Allah has disclosed a hidden sub-component that is hidden in that thing that has never appeared before. Naẓẓām’s view of miracle is something occurring under the power of the created, which Muʽtazilī scholars accept in the classification of miracles in relation to, the theory of sarfa. He suggests that the Qur'an, which he accepts under the power of the created, would not be a miracle, if the Arabs could dispute it. However, according to him, the Qur'an is a miracle because Allah prevents them from the dispute. In his understanding of sarfa, the miracles occur directly as an act of God’s divine intervention with human beings. This study investigates Naẓẓām’s view of miracles along with his theory of nature and his understanding of sarfa. (shrink)

In seinem Werk „Totalität und Unendlichkeit” ist Levinas darauf bedacht, eine radikale Philosophie der Transzendenz zu konzipieren. Seine Kritik der abendländischen philosophischen Tradition gipfelt in dem Vorwurf, dasz sie die Momente der Reflexion, der Immanenz und der Totalität übermäszig betont hat, und zwar auf Kosten der echten Transzendenz. Sie opfert die Andersheit des Anderen auf, um ihn systematisch auf Denselben zurückzuführen. Das wirklich Transzendente kann wesensmäszig nicht innerhalb des Horizontes einer Vorvertrautheit erscheinen, da es „totaliter aliter” und das von mir (...) vollkommen Getrennte ist. Es tritt mir im Antlitz des Anderen entgegen. Das Antlitz empfängt seinen Sinn nicht von etwas anderem, es ist selbst sinnverleihend. Infolge des Antlitzes existiere ich für den Anderen, habe ich die Möglichkeit, mich ihm gegenüber sittlich zu verhalten. Transzendenz wird daher ursprünglich im sittlichen Bewusztsein erfahren. Sittlichkeit offenbart sich als Widerstand gegen die immer anwesende Versuchung, den Anderen zu negieren. Das Gebot „Du sollst nicht töten !” ist die erste, nicht die letzte Sinngebung. Dadurch - und nicht durch blosze Erkenntnis — wird das Seiende als Seiendes bestätigt. Das Tötungsverbot ist jedoch der Kristallisationspunkt für alle anderen ethischen Normen. Die Person, die ich nicht beseitigen darf, musz ich auch achten, ihrer Schamhaftigkeit darf ich keine Gewalt antun, für sie bin ich verantwortlich. Auf der sittlichen Anerkennung des Anderen beruht die intersubjektive Verständigung, die Sprache, der vernünftige Umgang und dessen Institutionalisierung. Daher das Primat der praktischen Vernunft, das Levinas auf eine neue Weise zu begründen sucht. Die soeben skizzierte „Philosophie des Antlitzes” bildet den Inhalt der drei ersten Kapitel des Werkes „Totalität und Unendlichkeit”. Das vierte und letzte Kapitel trägt jedoch den bezeichnenden Titel „Jenseits des Antlitzes”. Hierin entwirft Levinas auf überraschende Weise eine Philosophie der Erotik und der Fruchtbarkeit. Was motiviert ihn zu dieser Wendung ? Ausgangspunkt der gesamten Problematik ist zweifellos die Frage nach dem Urteil Gottes, durch das meine Existenz gerechtfertigt oder verworfen wird. Ohne solch ein Urteil wäre Sittlichkeit lediglich subjektive Illusion oder Wahnsinn. Wie kann es aber gefällt werden ? Levinas weist alle theologischen und philosophischen Lösungsversuche ab. Das Urteil Gottes ist kein übernatürlicher Eingriff in das mundane Geschehen ; es tritt nicht, wie Hegel geglaubt hat, im Laufe der Weltgeschichte zutage ; es offenbart sich nicht in der Innerlichkeit einer der Mystik beflissenen Seele. Levinas zufolge bedarf das göttliche Urteil, um als Wahrheit hervortreten zu können, einer unendlichen Zeit. Diese ist ihrerseits nur denkbar infolge der menschlichen Generativität. Warum vertieft sich Levinas jedoch in eine Phänomenologie der Erotik ? Die Erotik ist das Gebiet des Zweideutigen. In ihr verschmelzen Immanenz und Transzendenz, sinnliches Bedürfnis und metaphysisches Verlangen. Das Weibliche erscheint einerseits als das Verletzliche, andererseits als das schamlos Herausfordernde. Die erotische Liebkosung möchte etwas ausdrücken, es gelingt ihr aber nicht, es zur Sprache zu bringen. Während die Philosophie des Antlitzes die Tagesansicht der menschlichen Existenz zeigt — Sittlichkeit, Verantwortung, Sprache, Vernunft — offenbart die Phänomenologie der Erotik deren Nachtseite. Levinas weist alle Versuche vorschneller Rationalisierung des erotischen Geschehens — die psychoanalytische, die Sartre'sche, die sozialpsychologische — zurück. Die sinnliche Liebe ist und bleibt, anthropologisch betrachtet, zweideutig. Ihre Ambiguität wird ausschlieszlich durch die Fruchtbarkeit überstiegen. Das Kind ist der geheime Sinn der Erotik, ohne dasz die Liebenden dies ahnen. — Levinas distanziert sich hier bewuszt von den „existenziellen” Phänomenologen, von Sartre und Merleau-Ponty. Ihnen zufolge ist der Mensch das „lumen naturale” ; d.h. dasz das Sinnvolle ausschlieszlich auf Grund von menschlicher Intentionalität geschieht. Levinas dagegen beweist, dasz das eminent Sinnvolle sich hinter dem Rücken des ego abspielt, dasz es durch kein cogito erkannt, erstrebt, entworfen wird. — Ueberdies wird durch die Einführung des Begriffes „Fruchtbarkeit” der Zauberkreis der phänomenologischen Immanenz gesprengt. Das erotische Abenteuer hat zwar seinen Ursprung in Mir, sein Endpunkt befindet sich jedoch auszer Mir. Die Subjektivität ist zwar unendliche Intersubjektivität, wie Husserl bereits erkannt hat, sie ist es aber lediglich infolge ihrer Generati vi tat. Sie ist m.a.W. dadurch unendlich, dasz sie sich immer aufs neue verjüngt. Die alte Generation stirbt ab und macht einer Jugend Platz, die radikal von neuem zu beginnen imstande ist. Levinas konzipiert nicht nur eine Philosophie der Jugend, er meditiert auch über das Wesen der Vaterschaft. Die Vaterschaft befreit das Ich von der Bürde seiner Selbstheit, denn das Ich ist der Sohn. Der Sohn bedeutet in Bezug auf den Vater einerseits einen „ Bruch" — und somit Diskontinuität — andererseits „Hilfsbedürftigkeit” — und daher Kontinuität. Die Intersubjektivität erhält sich somit als eine Kontinuität, die immer wieder unterbrochen wird. — Ein anderes wichtiges ethischreligiöses Denkmotiv ist das folgende : Jeder Sohn ist einziger Sohn. Er verdankt seine Unizität jedoch nicht irgendwelchen leiblich-seelischen Eigenschaften. Er ist einzig, weil der Vater ihn auf einzigartige Weise liebt. Infolgedessen ist jeder Sohn auch auserwählter Sohn. Er ist aber dazu bestimmt, zusammen mit anderen Auserwählten zu existieren. Hieraus entspringt die Idee der menschlichen Bruderschaft und der menschlichen Solidarität. Sie bilden die Grundlage jeglicher Gemeinschaftsbildung und jedweder sozialen Normierung. Die menschliche Sozialität ist, Levinas betont dies, kein tête-à-tête eines Ich mit einem Du ; sie schlieszt notwendigerweise die Möglichkeit eines Dritten in sich. Die menschlichen Gruppen und Gemeinschaften — auch die der Familie — sind von hier aus aufs neue philosophisch zu deuten. Ein Schlüssel zum Verständniss der Levinas'schen Metaphysik ist sein Begriff der „Infinitisierung” („infinition”), dessen Inhalt vielleicht mit der Wendung „dem Unendlichen entgegen wachsen” angedeutet werden kann. Mit welchem Recht spricht jedoch unser Philosoph von solch einem Wachsen, da er doch überzeugt ist, dasz der Mensch gänzlich — nach Leib und Seele — sterblich ist ? Im Geiste Levinas' musz man jedoch sagen, dasz gerade jene Sterblichkeit die „Infinitisierung” ermöglicht. Der Vater musz vollständig sterben, damit das Intervall zwischen den Generationen entsteht, das für die Erneuerung und Verjüngung der Intersubjektivität erforderlich ist. Auf diese Weise kann eine gänzlich neue Zeit anbrechen : die Zeit des Sohnes. Levinas' höchst originelle Philosophie der Zeitlichkeit kann am besten im Ausgang von Martin Heidegger — der hier ausschlieszlich als der Verfasser von „Sein und Zeit” zur Sprache kommt — belichtet werden. Beiden Denkern ist die Ueberzeugung eigen, dasz Temporalität unlöslich verbunden ist mit der — wie immer aufgefaszten — menschlichen Subjektivität. Levinas lehnt jedoch die Lehre von den temporalen Ekstasen, der endlichen Zukunft und dem Sein zum Tode leidenschaftlich ab. Das jemeinige Dasein stirbt zwar notwendigerweise und vollständig. Der Begriff der Subjektivität deckt sich jedoch nicht mit dem des individuellen Daseins. Subjektivität ist vielmehr generative Intersubjektivität. Als solche hat sie eine unendliche Zukunft vor sich. Der Gegensatz Heidegger-Levinas geht letztlich auf eine Verschiedenheit der ethischen Sicht zurück. (Levinas glaubt die Philosophie von „Sein und Zeit” als Ausdruck eines bestimmten Ethos verstehen zu müssen.) Heidegger zufolge ist das Dasein je seine Möglichkeit. Existierend kann es die Möglichkeit, die es ist, verwirklichen oder auch verfehlen : beides ist definitiv. Die Geschichte des individuellen Daseins nimmt auf diese Weise den Charakter eines unwiderruflichen Schicksals an. Dies gibt Levinas Anlasz zu grundsätzlichen Bedenken. Die Transzendenz, die Heidegger dem Dasein zuschreibt, ist keine echte Transzendenz, da sie auf die Gewinnung der je eigenen Möglichkeit gerichtet ist. Dies führt zu einer egozentrischen Selbstvergötterung und Vereinsamung. Das Ethos, das jene Philosophie des Daseins beseelt, ist das eines tragischen Heldentums. Dem stellt Levinas sein eigenes Ideal der spontanen Verantwortlichkeit, Dienstbarkeit und Geduld gegenüber. — Aber auch die Vorstellung einer endlichen Existenz, deren Verfehlungen und Versäumnisse schicksalhafte Endgültigkeit besitzen, ist unvereinbar mit der religiösen Sicht unseres Philosophen. Seiner Ansicht nach enthält der Begriff des endlichen Daseins einen impliziten Hinweis, dem nachzugehen ist. Levinas tut dies mit Hilfe der Begriffe „Jugend”, „radikale Erneuerung” und „Diskontinuität der Zeit”. Es ist völlig wahr, was Heidegger behauptet : Sein erscheint als Zeit, aber wohlgemerkt, als unendliche Zeit. Sie erstreckt sich durch die verschiedenen Zeiten und durch die Intervalle, die die Zeit des Vaters von der des Sohnes scheiden. Darum ist es undenkbar, dasz der eine Augenblick bruchlos aus der Ekstase des anderen hervorgeht. „Der Augenblick findet, während er fortdauert, den Tod und ersteht wieder. Tod und Auferstehung konstituieren die Zeit. Aber eine derartige formale Struktur setzt die Beziehung von Mir zum Anderen voraus und als deren Boden die Fruchtbarkeit.” Levinas' Philosophie ist nicht „optimistisch”. Von Anfang an betont er, dasz der Realist eigentlich anerkennen müszte, dasz das Wesen der Wirklichkeit der Krieg ist. Vom Frieden könne nur in der Sprache einer Eschatologie geredet werden. — Die Frage drängt sich nun auf, ob jenes Eschaton im Geiste von Levinas im Zusammenhang mit dem „Urteil Gottes” steht. Sie kann unter dem Vorbehalt bejaht werden, dasz dabei alle Vorstellungen, die dem Glauben — auch dem jüdischen Glauben — entstammen, ausgeklammert werden. Es handelt sich bei Levinas um eine Religiosität „innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft.” Das Eschaton ist unserem Philosophen zufolge nicht ein welterschütterndes Ereignis ; es unterbricht nicht den Verlauf der kosmischen und sozialen Prozesse ; es ist auch nicht „das Ende der Zeiten”. Das Eschaton ist nichts anderes als das Offenbar-werden des göttlichen Urteils oder, was dasselbe besagt ein Sprechen, durch das die Wahrheit und die Güte in Erscheinung tritt. Voraussetzung dafür ist eine „Konvergenz der Moralität und der Realität” ; d.h. dasz im Laufe einer unendlichen Zukunft das innerliche Leben der Menschheit vertieft, ihr Gewissen empfindlicher und ihre Geduld gröszer geworden sein wird. Denn jenes Sprechen erfolgt nicht mit Posaunenschall am „Jüngsten Tag”, es ereignet sich vielmehr alle Tage in den Beziehungen von Person zu Person. M.a.W. das Urteil Gottes wird immerwährend gefällt, wenn auch hinter den Kulissen der offiziellen Geschichte. Es wird gefällt, wenn der Erniedrigte und Beleidigte mich beschuldigt — beschuldigt einfach dadurch, dasz er mir in die Augen schaut. Das Antlitz des Anderen lädt mich vor Gericht, vor Ihm musz ich mich verantworten, Ich, in meiner persönlichen Einzigkeit und Unersetzlichkeit. Meinerseits unterwerfe Ich mich dem Gerichte Gottes in dem Masze, als Ich bereit bin, jene Anklage gegen mich zu vernehmen und mich zu verantworten. Wohlgemerkt : Levinas hält daran fest, dasz das eschatologische Urteil das Werk Gottes ist ; es wird jedoch ausschlieszlich in Menschen und durch Menschen zu einer Erfahrung. Levinas’ Ueberzeugung hinsichtlich der zunehmenden Empfindlichkeit des menschheitlichen Gewissens beruht nicht auf einem oberflächlichen Fortschrittsglauben. Ihr liegt vielmehr eine metaphysische Sicht zugrunde. Den Schlüssel zu ihrem Verständnis bietet wiederum der Begriff der „Infinitisierung”. Sie macht sich in analoger Weise auf drei verschiedenen Ebenen geltend. -Die erste ist die der Fruchtbarkeit. Rein empirisch kann man feststellen, dasz das fruchtbare Wesen andere Wesen hervorbringt, die ihrerseits fruchtbar sind, und dasz auf diese Weise die Fruchtbarkeit in der Natur zunimmt. Hinter dieser empirischen Aussage verbirgt sich jedoch eine ethisch-metaphysische Wahrheit. Im Geiste Levinas' müszte man sagen : Kreative Güte bringt nicht nur Güte hervor, sondern überdies noch mehr Güte. Hier liegt eine Analogie mit dem vor, was soeben als das göttliche Urteil bezeichnet wurde. Durch das Urteil, das der Verfolgte und Unterdrückte über mich fällt, wird mein schlummerndes Gewissen geweckt. Diese Weckung wird ihrerseits eine bleibende gewissensvollere Haltung zur Folge haben. Ich werde jetzt andere Anklagen eher vernehmen und mich ihnen bereitwilliger stellen. Es ist hier wieder die Rede von einer „Infinitisierung”, d.h. von einem unendlichen Wachstum in der Richtung auf das Gute zu. Das dritte und höchste Niveau ist das des metaphysischer Verlangens („ Désir"). Dieses unterscheidet sich wesentlich von dem egozentrischen Bedürfnis („ besoin"). Was letzteres betrifft, gilt das Folgende : Hat sich das Ich seines Objektes bemächtigt — hat es dieses theoretisch erkannt oder praktisch in Besitz genommen —, dann ist das Bedürfnis gestillt. Es ist erloschen, wenn das Andere, das Objekt, Mir, Demselben, einverleibt wurde. Daraus wird die grundsätzliche Endlichkeit jenes egozentrischen Lebens ersichtlich. Das metaphysische Verlangen dagegen ist unersättlich, „nicht, weil es einem unendlichen Hunger entspricht, sondern weil es keine Speise begehrt”. Es ist ja auf kein Objekt gerichtet. Dem Unendlichen gegenüber ist kein intentionales Verhalten möglich. Wohl aber ist es denkbar, dasz das endliche Wesen von dem überwältigenden Charakter des Unendlichen getroffen wird. Je mehr mein Verständnis für jenes alles Uebertreffende zunimmt, desto gröszer wird auch mein metaphysisches Verlangen. Es liegt also wieder eine „Infinitisierung” vor. Das Eschaton ereignet sich demnach jetzt und hier, wenn auch die offizielle Geschichte von ihm nichts weisz. Es besteht in einem unmerklichen Reifen der Menschheit, die sich in einer unendlichen Zukunft einem gänzlich neuen ethischsozialen Zustand nähert. Der eschatalogische Endzustand kann vielleicht als die vollkommene Harmonie zwischen Sozialität und Personalität charakterisiert werden. (shrink)

In her book Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion, Pamela Sue Anderson generously discusses some of my ideas. In particular, she considers my views about a certain kind of philosophical nonsense. She argues that I am not interested in engaging seriously with such nonsense; and that my not being interested in engaging seriously with it betrays my gender. This essay is a response to Anderson’s discussion. I argue that she is guilty of certain errors, both exegetical and philosophical. In the (...) course of doing so, I raise some issues about what we can aspire to as philosophers. These issues in turn bear on the relation between philosophy and the feminine, between philosophy and the masculine, and between philosophy and the human. Towards the end of my essay I urge that the third of these relations – the relation between philosophy and the human – is of far greater significance than either of the other two. (shrink)

I am writing this during the Christmas holidays, and one of the papers in this issue brings to mind the extraordinary serenity and peace of mind with which Joseph and Mary dealt with the strange happenings surrounding the birth of their first son, baby Jesus, who according to the Bible was a N=1 experiment. The paper by Nathan et al studies parental decision-making in relation to neonatal research. They used the MacArthur competence assessment tool for clinical research to assess parental (...) competence in parents of neonates undergoing cardiac surgery. The parents were asked for permission to enrol the neonates in one of three non-therapeutic studies before the surgery. The study shows that parents in this situation in general had …. (shrink)

The study aimed to identify the reality of the use of social networks in the technical colleges in Palestine, where the variables of social networks were included. The analytical descriptive method was used in the study. A questionnaire consisting of (12) items was randomly distributed to college workers Technology in the Gaza Strip. The sample of the study consisted of (205) employees of these colleges. The response rate was 74.5%. The results showed a high degree of approval for the dimensions (...) of the social networks and a relative weight (74.15%) according to the perspective of the employees of the technical colleges in the Gaza Strip. The results of the study showed that there is a high level of social networking areas (site management and Website Content) in the technical colleges in the Gaza Strip. The field of site management ranked first with a relative weight of 74.91%, and second and last (Content Site) with a relative weight (73.38%). The results showed that there were differences between colleges in the use of social networks where the results showed that the most common colleges used these networks (UCAS) and the least used is (GTC). The results showed no differences between male and female employees in the use of social networks in technical colleges. The researchers suggest a number of recommendations, including: the need to raise awareness of the importance of Facebook and other social networking sites, through the holding of courses for employees in technical colleges, and to identify the ways to optimize the use of such sites, and the benefits of this use, and reflected positively on technical colleges. And the adoption of dealing with the various social networking sites as a reality, and the Palestinian and Arab technical colleges, use them in accordance with the objectives of technical colleges. Advise the Department of Technical Colleges to devote time to their presence on social networks to follow the public and respond to their queries. There is a need for the attention of decision-makers in technical colleges in social sites, because they are considered an important and effective means of communication, and the link between beneficiaries and decision-makers. There is a need to promote the use of modern electronic means of work and the need to increase the link of customers to the college through electronic services. (shrink)

Behaving ethically depends on the ability to recognize that ethical issues exist, to see from an ethical point of view. This ability to see and respond ethically may be related more to attributes of corporate culture than to attributes of individual employees. Efforts to increase ethical standards and decrease pressure to behave unethically should therefore concentrate on the organization and its culture. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how total quality (TQ) techniques can facilitate the development of a (...) cooperative corporate culture that promotes and encourages ethical behavior throughout an organization. (shrink)

Objectives: to assess physicians’ and patients’ views in Saudi Arabia towards involving the patient versus the family in the process of diagnosis disclosure and decision-making, and to compare them with views from the USA and Japan.Design: A self-completion questionnaire was translated to Arabic and validated.Participants: Physicians from different specialties and ranks and patients in a hospital or attending outpatient clinics from 6 different regions in KSA.Results: In the case of a patient with incurable cancer, 67% of doctors and 51% of (...) patients indicated that they would inform the patient in preference to the family of the diagnosis . Assuming the family already knew, 56% of doctors and 49% of patients would tell the patient even if family objected . However, in the case of HIV infection, 59% of physicians and 81% of patients would inform the family about HIV status without the patient’s consent . With regards to withholding ventilatory support, about 50% of doctors and over 60% of patients supported the use of mechanical ventilation in a patient with advanced cancer, regardless of the wishes of the patient or the family. Finally, the majority of doctors and patients were against assisted suicide.Conclusions: Although there was more recognition for a patient’s autonomy amongst physicians, most patients preferred a family centred model of care. Views towards information disclosure were midway between those of the USA and Japan. Distinctively, however, decisions regarding life prolonging therapy and assisted suicide were not influenced to a great extent by wishes of the patient or family, but more likely by religious beliefs. (shrink)

Applying the resolution–scale relativity principle to develop a mechanics of non-differentiable dynamical paths, we find that, in one dimension, stationary motion corresponds to an Itô process driven by the solutions of a Riccati equation. We verify that the corresponding Fokker–Planck equation is solved for a probability density corresponding to the squared modulus of the solution of the Schrödinger equation for the same problem. Inspired by the treatment of the one-dimensional case, we identify a generalization to time dependent problems in any (...) number of dimensions. The Itô process is then driven by a function which is identified as establishing the link between non-differentiable dynamics and standard quantum mechanics. This is the basis for the scale relativistic interpretation of standard quantum mechanics and, in the case of applications to chaotic systems, it leads us to identify quantum-like states as characterizing the entire system rather than the motion of its individual constituents. (shrink)

Anhand des fiktiven Falles eines jungen Mannes, dessen Leben trotz der vermeintlichen Vorteile von verbesserten genetischen Anlagen nicht so gerät, wie es sich die Eltern vorgestellt haben, fragen wir nach dem Maßstab des Erfolgs von genetischen Interventionen am Menschen. Wir kommen zu dem Schluß, daß die bisherigen Erfahrungen, die wir an anderen, weniger komplizierten Organismen wie Algen schon gesammelt haben, darauf hindeuten, daß die Resultate von Genmanipulationen viel weniger vorhersagbar sind und damit die Risiken für die Menschen viel höher und (...) unüberschaubarer sein werden, als die Optimisten aus der Genforschung bisher anzunehmen scheinen. Außerdem stellen wir die Frage, ob diese Richtung der vermeintlichen Verbesserung des menschlichen Lebens wirklich geeignet ist, tatsächlich die Leben der einzelnen Menschen oder der Menschheit insgesamt besser zu machen, oder ob sie nicht vielmehr auf einem engen Begriff des Lebenserfolgs beruht, der von den eigentlich ethischen Fragen nach dem besseren Leben für die Menschen eher ablenkt. Wenn dies der Fall wäre, würde sich die Suche nach den entscheidenden Verbesserungen des menschlichen Lebens auf dem Wege der genetischen Intervention nicht nur aus technischen, sondern auch aus ethischen Gründen als bedenklich erweisen. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To study the opinions of nationals (Emiratis) and doctors practising in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with regard to informing terminally ill patients. DESIGN: Structured questionnaires administered during January 1995. SETTING: The UAE, a federation of small, rich, developing Arabian Gulf states. PARTICIPANTS: Convenience samples of 100 Emiratis (minimum age 15 years) and of 50 doctors practising in government hospitals and clinics. RESULTS: Doctors emerged as consistently less in favour of informing than the Emiratis were, whether the patient was (...) described as almost certain to die during the next six months or as having a 50% chance of surviving, and even when it was specified that the patient was requesting information. In the latter situation, a third of doctors maintained that the patient should not be told. Increasing survival odds reduced the number of doctors selecting to inform; but it had no significant impact on Emiratis' choices. When Emiratis were asked whether they would personally want to be informed if they had only a short time to live, less than half responded in the way they had done to the in principle question. CONCLUSIONS: The doctors' responses are of concern because of the lack of reference to ethical principles or dilemmas, the disregard of patients' wishes and dependency on survival odds. The heterogeneity of Emiratis' responses calls into question the usefulness of invoking norms to explain inter-society differences. In the current study, people's in principle choices did not provide a useful guide to how they said they would personally wish to be treated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:72 Reviews RUSSELL VERSUS THE HAPPINESS INDUSTRY Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa [email protected] Tim Phillips. Bertrand Russell’sThe Conquest of Happiness; a Modern-Day Interpretation of a Self-Help Classic. Oxford: Infinite Ideas, 2010. Pp. 118. 978-1906821 -27-2 (pb). us$11.95. German translation as Bertrand Russells Eroberung des Glücks in a “Business Classics” series (gabal Verlag, 2012). he popular writing Bertrand Russell undertook to make money has long roused (...) the indignation of those interested in his more technical specialized work, and his 1930 The Conquest of Happiness ranks among the more extreme examples of this pot-boiling genre. Ludwig Wittgenstein denounced Russell’s Conquest of Happiness as a “vomitive.” And the best ways of understanding Russell’s own assessments of his book are unclear, owing to the various sentiments his biographers report. According to Ronald Clark, he said: “… The Conquest of Happiness … I am not very proud of”;1 whereas Caroline Moorehead reports “he was later to say that, of all his books, he felt this had done the most good”.2 In his autobiography, Russell allows us how he wrote The Conquest of Happiness at a stage in his life “when I needed much self-command and much that I had learned by painful experience if I was to maintain any endurable level of happiness.”The emotional challenges to which he was subjected at the time he wrote the book “introduced an intolerable tension into every moment of daily life.” Beacon Hill School, which Russell had started with his second wife, Dora, in 1927, was in such dire straits financially by 1930 that Russell was compelled to resort to much popular writing and lecturing in order to remain solvent. In 1930, Dora gave birth to a daughter fathered by the American journalist Grif- fin Barry.This marked the beginning of the end to Russell’s marriage to Dora. Add to the foregoing Russell’s strained relations with Wittgenstein, when the ______ 1 The Life of Bertrand Russell, p. 448. 2 Bertrand Russell, p. 383. q= Reviews 73 former was asked to be one of the examiners for Wittgenstein’s phd at Cambridge. Although the phd was awarded and Wittgenstein secured a grant to conduct research at Trinity College, Cambridge for five years, Russell and Wittgenstein’s interaction at the time resulted in an end to their friendship. In general, however much control Russell may have had over matters at earlier points in his life, 1930 was a time he was largely at the mercy of unstable circumstances.The repose and leisure on which he had depended for his philosophic activity were not then available to him. Personal problems came to the fore and he was more prone to depression than usual. About The Conquest of Happiness, written primarily with the American market in mind, he remarked to the publisher Stanley Unwin: “I think they [Americans] mostly share Al Capone’s ideas of happiness, which are in a somewhat different vein from mine.”The book became a bestseller in America. Tim Phillips writes on business, technology, social change and innovation, and he has published more than a dozen expositions of other famous authors’ works. His book Bertrand Russell’s The Conquest of Happiness is a faithful tour through this Russell classic. Phillips provides a readable account of the original ’s lucid points. The treatment is certainly not pretentious or obfuscatory, as it abounds with examples of Russell’s points from contemporary pop culture. It features corroborating quotations from other authors and is salted with some results of modern surveys. Bertrand Russell’s The Conquest of Happiness has good reminders of the differences between the nature of Russell’s times and lifestyle and that of our own, the most notable being the absence during Russell’s day of a happiness industry. Nowadays, we are bombarded with “self-help” books “encouraging us to obsess about ourselves or manipulate others” (p. 9). Moreover, when Russell wrote The Conquest of Happiness, “the idea of an antidepressant pill was as likely as someone walking on the moon and the idea that people could ‘suffer from stress’ was thirty years into the future. For all... (shrink)

Turkish-Islamic literature contains numerous religious literar writings. In the existing literature, it can be seen that many kinds such as tawhīd, munājāt, nʿat, mawlid, hilya, hijrah-nāma, shafāʿat-nāma, miʿrāj, qisas al-anbiya, ramaḍāniyya, and al-asmā al-ḥusnā were written. Al-Asmā al-ḥusnā, written in the form of poetry and prose, were mostly sharḥ or their khawaṣṣ were explained. Çihil-nām al-Manẓūm, which is mentioned in the study, was written as khawaṣṣ al-asmā al-ḥusnā. The work is a poet entitled as Fażāyī. Manuscript was written in the (...) last quarter of the fifteenth century, and thus, it is presumed that the poet lived in the same century. This work has been identified in a manuscript. In addition, the poet’s Hadiyyat al-aḥbāb, der-Bayān al-maqāmāt al-darwīshān, Kitāb al-sharʿiyyat al-arbāb, and Ghazaliyyāt al-Darwīsh Fażāyī four other works have been identified. In the writings of the asmā al-ḥusnās, the names of ninety-nine were emphasized. In this study, the forty names of God are expressed. The text presented is a continuation of the tradition of writing some prose works written in Arabic and Persian. Çihil-nām al-Manẓūm, written in Arabic prose and known as Asmā al-Idrīsiyya it can be seen as a free stsyle translation of the prophet Idrīs. Forty names in the content of the work, their proper-ties, when, how much and how to read is explained. In this study, firstly the information about the subject of Qurʾān, hadith, Arabic, Persian and Turkish literature in the beautiful names of God is provided. Then, the information about the poet Fażāyī was given. Çihil-nām al-Manẓūm was introduced and the transcriptional form of the text was given.SummaryOne of the reasons that deeply affect a nation is the change of religion. This change did not only affect the individual but also influenced the society in which he was born and grew. One of the nations with strong influence is the Turks. Turks, after Islamization, have estab-lished a new civilization. One of the areas where this Islamic civilization reflects is the literary aspect of society. In this literature, which has begun to be formed, religious genres such as tawhīd, munājāt, nʿat, mawlid, hilya, hijrah-nāma, shafāʿat-nāma, miʿrāj, qisas al-anbiya, ramaḍāniyya, have been revealed. One of them is about God. Religious literary writings about God were written in the form of tawhīd and munājāts, which consist of one or more prophets found at the head of the dīwāns, or as the annotations of asmā al-ḥusnā or as khawaṣṣ asmā al-ḥusnā.In time, the need for some Turkish literary and scientific works to be translated into a different language were born. It can be seen that with some changes such as subtraction and addition, texts are rewritten or poetic works are translated into prose. The original of our research subject Çihil-nām al- Manẓūm’s is written in Arabic and prose. Çihil-nām al-Manẓūm, it is a munājāt of the work known as Asmā al-Idrīsiyya, which describes the call of prophet Idrīs.Asmā al-ḥusnā is a religious term used mostly to describe the attributes and names of God. In the Qurʾān, there is no information about the number of asmā al-ḥusnā mentioned as a concept. However, the number of the names of God in the Qurʾān is 155. This number is differ-ent in ḥadīths. It is widely accepted that the number of asmā al-ḥusnā is 99. Some Islamic schol-ars have argued against such restricting statements, arguing that ninety-nine names, such as the hiding of the Night of Qadr, were hidden in all Divine names during the month of ramaḍān, while others suggested that the number of ninety-nine was large number of asmās (names).The first examples of asmā al-ḥusnā were written in Arabic literature. Some of them are not detached: Abū Manṣūr al-Māturidī (d. 333/944) Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, Abū ʿAbdullāh al-Ḥalīmī (d. 403/1012) al-Minhāj fī shuʿabiʾl īmān, Taḳī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) al-Īmān. A part of asmā al-ḥusnās is also a single work: Abū Isḥāq al-Zajjaj (d. 311/923) Tafsīr al-asmāi’llāh al-ḥusnā, Aḥmad b. Husayin al-Bayhaḳī (d. 458/1066) al-Asmā al-ṣifāt and ʿAbd al-karīm b. Havāzin al-Quşayrī (d. 465/1072) Sharḥ al-asmāi’llāh. In addition to Arabic, it is useful to talk about some of the asmā al-ḥusnās which is written in Persian. Muḥammed al-Shrāzī al-Nishāburī (d. 904/1498) al-Risāla der-asmā al-ḥusnā, Çarkhī Yaʿḳūb b. ʿOthmān (d. 851/1447) Sharḥ al-asmāi’llāh and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Aḥmad al-Jāmī (d. 898/1492) Muʿammā al-Jāmī.Islamic nations have created an enormous collection of literature about God. Among them, asmā al-ḥusnās has a special importance. Many asmā al-ḥusnā were written in Turkish literature. The most famous among the verses of Ibn Isa b. Majduddīn ʿĪsā Saruḥanī (d. 967/559) is Sharḥ al-asmā al-ḥusnā. Other than that, Ḥusayin b. Aḥmad Sirozī (d. 1000/1401) Sharḥ asmā al-ḥusnā, Aḥmad Shākir Pasha (d. 1234/1818) Rawḍ-ı Ward, Ibrahim Mahdī (d. 1345/1926) al-Kanz al-asmā fī sharḥ al-asmā al-ḥusnā and Bijaqji-zāda Ismā‘īl Haqqi b. ʿOthmān (ö.1352/1933) Asmā al-ḥusnā’s naẓman tafsīr this work is shown among the major works written in this field. Again, the works of the late Sheykh-oghlu Muṣṭafā (d. 817/1414) Khawaṣṣ al-asmā al-ḥusnā, Ṣubḥī al-Bursawī (n.d.) Sharḥ al-manẓūm al-asmā al-ḥusnā, Ḥākim Sayyid Maḥmad Afandi (d. 1184/1770) Sharḥ manẓūm al-asmā al-ḥusnā, Lāmiʿ Jelebi (d. 938/1532) Sharḥ al-muʿammayāt ʿalā asmā al-ḥusnā, Ḥamdī Afandi (n.d.) Sharḥ al-manẓūm al-asmā al-ḥusnā, Naḥīfī (d. 1151/1738) Manẓūm al-asmā al-ḥusnā, ʿAbd al-Majīd b. Naṣūḥ Ṭosyavī (d. 996/1588) Sharḥ al-asmā al-ḥusnā can be listed among other notable works.In this study, a khawaṣṣ al-asmā al-ḥusnā is examined. Khawaṣṣ; khāṣṣ and khāṣṣa are the plural of the words khawaṣṣ al-wukalā, khawaṣṣa al-balda, the properties of some drugs, khawaṣṣa al-Qurʾān al-karīm, khawaṣṣa al-ism al-aʿẓam; a force that is found in something and not from others means special case. The verses of the Qurʾān, the rings, the hours of the days, some prayers, the names of God have some of the accents. It is believed that the desire of the person who reads them in certain conditions, in a certain amount, or in any manner, in specific hours, will occur. The fact that the concept of khawaṣṣ met these meanings allowed him to acquire scientific knowledge and to call it “khawaṣṣ science” characteristic in the literature.The works that deal with the Qurʾān and the asmā al-ḥuṣnā are written. Some of these works written in Arabic and Turkish literature are: Risāle fī khawaṣṣ al-asmā al-ḥusnā: Zunnūn al-Miṣrī, Khawaṣṣ al-Qurʾān: Ghazālī, ʿIḳdu al-manẓūm fī khawaṣṣ al-ḥurūf: Muḥyī al-Dīn al-ʿArabī, Asmā al-Idrīsiyya: Shāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, Khawaṣṣ al-asmā al-ḥusnā: Shakh-oghlu Muṣṭafā, Sharḥ al-manẓūm al-asmā al-ḥusnā: Ṣubḥī al-Bursawī, Sharḥ al-asmā al-ḥusnā: Ibn ʿIsā b. Majd al-Dīn Ṣaruhanī, Manẓūm al-asmā al-ḥusnā sharḥ: Ḥākim Sayyid Maḥmad Afandi, Manẓūm al-asmā al-ḥusnā: Naḥīfī, Sharḥ al-asmā al-ḥusnā and khawaṣṣuhā: Imām Shabrāwī.One of the works in which asmā al-ḥusnā was described is attributed to prophet Idrīs. Among the miracles of prophet Idrīs, there have been intresting miracoulus performances such as possessing the knowledge of astronomy, fortune, mathematics, plants, writing, sew-ing, using the scales and strange art. The mysterious secrets were revaled to him in 30 ṣuḥuf. His major miracles are governing spiritual beings, knowing the properties of the beings and possessing the knowledge of various unknown things. Again, he wrote a book about the char-acteristics of letters. Aristotle later wrote a commentary using the majority of the information found in this book. Some of the works are written to narrate the Prophet Idrīs’s praising God with forty names:Muḥammad al-Tunisian, al-Ravḍatu al-Sundusiyya fī asmā al-ḥusnā al-Idrīsiyya al-Suhrawardiyya; Shāb al-Dīn Yaḥya b. Ḥabash al-Suhrawardī, Çihil-nām. Among these, the most famous is the work called Asmā al-Idrīsiyyā, written by Suhrawardī. Here, in addition to the asmā al-ḥusnā (forty names), prayers, prayers, conquests, their meanings, and the merits of reading them are explained. The book is written in Arabic. Many copies of this work have been identi-fied. Here are a few of these: Sulaymāniyya Hagia Sophia, K. 1870; Sulaymāniyya, Hagia Sophia, 377; Bāyazıd State Library 1314; National Library A005133-03 23b-33a; Adana Public Library 140; National Library, 06 Mil Yz A 9084/6.The works describing Asmā al-Idrīsiyya were written as prose. The work examined in this study was written as a manuscript. Çihil-nām-ı Manẓūm is distinguished from the others in this respect. Another point that makes the study important is the fact that Çihil-nām-ı Manẓūm has a very old period, this is written in the fifteenth century. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To study some ethical problems created by accession of a previously nomadic and traditional society to modern invasive medicine, by assessment of physicians' attitudes towards sharing information and decision-making with patients in the setting of a serious illness. DESIGN: Self-completion questionnaire administered in 1993. SETTING: Riyadh, Jeddah, and Buraidah, three of the largest cities in Saudi Arabia. SURVEY SAMPLE: Senior and junior physicians from departments of internal medicine and critical care in six hospitals in the above cities. RESULTS: A (...) total of 249 physicians participated in the study. Less than half indicated they provided information on diagnosis and prognosis of serious illnesses all the time. Physicians who were more senior and those who spoke Arabic fared better than other groups. The majority preferred to discuss information with close relatives rather than patients, even when the patients were mentally competent. Most of the physicians felt patients had the right to refuse a specific treatment modality, and 68% denied patients the right to demand such a treatment if considered futile. Further analysis showed that physicians' attitudes varied along a spectrum from passive to paternalistic with the largest group in a balanced position. CONCLUSIONS: In traditional societies where physicians are regarded as figures of authority and family ties are important, there is a considerable shift of access to information and decision-making from patients to their physicians and relatives in a manner that threatens patients' autonomy. Ethical principles, wider availability of invasive medical technology and a rise in public awareness dictate an attitude change. (shrink)

This thoughtful reflection on a valuable questionnaire survey of patients' attitudes regarding being told that their dentist had been infected with hepatitis B is of very direct relevance to HIV, as the authors show.1 The measured tone and analytical approach are a welcome change from the stridency that has characterised some of the debate elsewhere. I am very conscious that more time and effort has gone into drafting and redrafting, amending, revising and refining policy in this area than in any (...) other area of HIV control, with the probable exception of blood transfusion. Yet this is the setting that has the lowest risk among all established routes. Why has it been so hard to establish a satisfactory policy and practice to deal with this situation?Many factors, of course, apply. However, much seems to stem from a prevailing view, fostered by recent political administrations, that health care can be delivered in a risk-free way. This has also been linked with a “blame culture”, where adverse outcomes are seen as someone's fault, and where the professions are regarded with distrust. It has been fuelled by levels of concern about risk for HIV that have stemmed more from media “stories” about risk than careful risk assessment.Hence Blatchford et al comment that public anxiety about HIV relative to hepatitis B was a factor in assessing how the incident was handled, implying that HIV was of greater concern - even though the risk of transmission is some two orders of magnitude less. Interestingly, they also comment that, because the risk of death with HIV is higher than for hepatitis B, this balances the overall risk. I am not sure of the validity of this argument, …. (shrink)

The authors of “A Conceptual Model for the Translation of Bioethics Research and Scholarship” argue that bioethics must respond to institutional pressures by demonstrating that it is having an impact in the world. Any impact, the authors observe, must be “informed” by the goals of the discipline of bioethics. The concept of bioethics as a discipline is central to their argument. They begin by citing an essay that Daniel Callahan wrote in the first issue of Hastings Center Studies. Callahan argued (...) in this 1973 piece that bioethics had yet to attain the status of a discipline, and he lauded the freedom of being able to define a new discipline. Callahan's essay shares with Mathews and colleague's a peculiarity: neither ever defines what it means to refer to something as a “discipline.” To define a discipline does mean attending to the intended end product of scholarly activity, so I concur with Mathews et al.’s focus on outcomes. But I am concerned that in their argument they confusingly entangle their understanding of an academic discipline's internal goals, its telos, with its potential to have an impact on the external world, its praxis. The confusion that this can bring exposes what I believe is a profound problem within bioethics, the discipline's peculiar and at times intellectually hazardous relationship with its institutional hosts. (shrink)

Islam; customs and practices; Islamic ethics; Islamic law.

Seldom have I read a book so scholarly and yet so delightful. It takes us to view major concepts of both God and the good life of philosophical and religious writers of the world from the Bible, Plato, and Aristotle to philosophers of India and China. Besides the usual figures, there are studies of Augustine, Maimonides, al-Farabi, and al-Ghazali. As a bonus, Lobel also touches on recent figures such as Iris Murdoch, Alfred North Whitehead, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor. While (...) I am not competent to judge the accuracy of the author’s treatment of Maimonides, the Muslims, and Murdoch, I found the rest of her analyses to be accurate. She has previously... (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der nationalsozialistische Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Frankfurt am Main, Dr. Friedrich Krebs, wollte den Beweis erbringen, dass auch seine Stadt an vorderster Front an der nationalsozialistischen Volksgemeinschaft mitzubauen gedenke und eben nach 1933 keine „Stadt der Juden und der Demokraten“ mehr war. In diesem Ruf stand Frankfurt bei führenden Nationalsozialisten. Der Sport als Element der Körperkultur schien dabei geeignet, Frankfurt ein neues „Image“ zu geben. Als Sportstadt, so Krebs’ Vorstellung, könne sich Frankfurt neu positionieren. Die zahlreichen Bemühungen von Krebs und (...) das letztendliche Scheitern der Idee werden in diesem Beitrag referiert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass sich Krebs und die städtischen Institutionen bereits Ansätzen bedienten, wie sie im modernen Stadtmarketing gängig sind. Darüber hinaus wird deutlich, welcher hohe Stellenwert dem Sport als Instrument von Wirtschaft und vor allem von Politik bereits seit den 1920er Jahren zugebilligt wurde. Dies führte zu einer Instrumentalisierung des Sports durch die Nationalsozialisten nicht nur bei den Olympischen Spielen 1936, sondern eben auch auf kommunaler Ebene. (shrink)

Explores intellectual and philosophical evolution of German philosopher Martin Heidegger, focusing on period after World War II. Analyzes how Heidegger s ideas, particularly his notion of being, influenced and were influenced by postwar context, including confrontation with Nazism and emergence of new philosophical currents. Argues that Heidegger s work offers relevant insights for contemporary philosophical debates and calls for a critical dialogue with his legacy. Discusses Heidegger s philosophy in the context of French and German philosophical schools, highlighting relevance of (...) his ideas and impact they had on contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

IntroductionAs part of a unifying theory of autism, Ben Shalom (2009) proposed that while procedural, perceptual and semantic memory functions are intact in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), the more integrative level of episodic memory is impaired. According to Ben Shalom, this reduced integration may be due to the reduced function of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which may also explain the reduced integration found in motor, sensory-perceptual and emotional processes in ASD. The present review examines this hypothesis, by focusing on (...) evidence regarding autobiographical memory (AM) episodes in ASD – arguably the highest form of memory integration processes. Most research on memory in ASD thus far has focused on memory for experimentally-presented stimuli (Lind, 2010;Boucher et al., 2012). The present paper builds on this literature to examine the rich evidence that has recently accumulated from in-depth, systematic studies of autobiographical memory in ASD – memories of personally-related events that are naturalistically accumulated over a person’s lifetime. Of note, research on AM is limited in its focus on memories that cannot be as readily verified (but see Bruck et al., 2007), and in its reliance on high-functioning verbal individuals. Nonetheless, studies of AM provide us with an unparalleled perspective on the naturalistic process of memory integration in ASD. Specifically, this review aims to determine how well memory episodes are integrated in ASD; which elem... (shrink)

One of the most important issues that distinguishes the Baghdādī branch of the Muʿtazila from the Baṣran branch is their view on ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661). Basra branch accepts the order of virtue of the first four caliphs as their order of coming to office, while the Baghdad branch considers the first three caliphs legitimate, but considers Ali more virtuous than them. The Baghdādī Muʿtazilīs who outspokenly defended this idea were Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (...) (d. 319/931) and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258). Among them, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd was renowned as “the greatest scholar of the Muʿtazila” and was considered one of the last representatives of this school. He ardently defended ʿAlī's superiority in his commentary on Nahj al-Balāgha, the famous collection of Ali’s sermons, letters and wisdom sayings. In his defense, he rebutted some criticisms about ʿAlī’s political decisions from his school’s point of view. Many items of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s rebuttal are worthy of analysis in terms of their content, style and approach. This article aims to present a detailed account of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s aforementioned refutations. In addition to the descriptive method, the interpretative method was also employed in the article. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd did not consider Ali's infallibility necessary (wājib), unlike Imamiyya, he accepted it. Therefore, he responded to the criticisms directed at Ali, starting from the point of Ali's innocence. According to Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd: (a) After the death of the Prophet, ʿAlī insisted on becoming the new leader of the Muslim community. He did not act hastily to assume the caliphate because he was not expecting any opposition to that. However, when the events took a different turn, he did not escalate the situation, rather accepted the status quo. (b) ʿAlī also did the right thing by participating in ʿUmar b. Al-Khaṭṭāb’s (d. 23/644) electoral shūrā. This was an opportunity for him to become the next caliph, and reinstitute a system in accordance with the Qurʿānic principles and sunna of the Prophet. (c) It was also not an error when ʿAlī decided to stay in Medina during the events of ʿUthmān’s murder (d. 35/656). He played an active role in dissuading the rebels from their attempt to kill ʿUthmān, but he was in no position to know that his activity would be used against him later by the Umayyads who accused ʿAlī of being complicit in ʿUthmāns’s murder. (d) ʿAlī took the caliphate after ʿUthmān because of his popularity among the people. In this way, he managed to prevent an unqualified person to occupy the seat of the caliphate. (e) When the Battle of Camel broke out, those who demanded justice and opposed ʿAlī were in error. (f) When ʿAlī became the new caliph, his decision to remove Muʿāwīya (d. 60/680) from the governorship of Syria was correct. This is because Muʿāwīya would have refused to accept ʿAlī’s leadership even had he stayed in office as a governor. ʿAlī understood that the conflict would end only through fighting, so he did not lose time in marching against Muʿāwīya. (g) During the battle he abided by the sharīʿa and allowed the Syrian army to access water. (h) It was not ʿAlī, but those defectors in his army who obliged him to end the fighting through arbitration. (i) When ʿAlī agreed to sign the Ṣiffīn ceasefire agreement and did not use his title amīr al-muʾminīn, he followed the Prophet's example since the latter also refrained from using his title during the Ḥudaybiyya agreement. (j) ʿAlī also cannot be blamed for those among his supporters, such as the poet al-Najāshī, who defected and joined the ranks of Muʿāwīya. The motivations for the defectors were either to attain worldly gains or to escape from punishment for the crimes which they had committed. (k) When Muʿāwīya managed to conquer Egypt, ʿAlī’s governors of the province, Qays b. Saʿd (d. 60/680) or Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr (d. 38/658), did nothing for which they could be blamed. (l) And finally, ʿAlī never had guards to protect him because he was never afraid of being assassinated. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd took Ali's innocence as a basis while presenting these views, he did not make inconsistent comments in general and did not say things contrary to historical facts. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge historical value of his views in question. (shrink)

This article aims to analyze the views of two pioneering Ḥanafī scholars, Abū Manṣūr al- Māturīdī and Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī, on the meaning of death and life in terms of their general doctrine of religion. In the first part, the general framework of Māturīdī and Dabūsī’s evidentialist conception of religion are drawn. In the second part, Māturīdī's views on the meaning of death and life and are explored. In the third part, the views of Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī on the meaning (...) of death and life, who establishes a striking connection between the divine order and existence, divine prohibition and non-existence, are examined, and a general evaluation is offered in the last section. Al-Māturīdī proposed a very original and systematic example of doing philosophy of religion, which still promising for the modern problems of the field, by opening the phenomenon of religion itself to discussion, and analyzing the nature and elements of religion. Māturīdī aims to place the problems on a universal and theoretical basis and to present a holistic, metaphysical understanding while discussing specific and particular issues in religion. Just as there are main notes in classical Western music that repeat throughout the symphony in baroque style, there are universal principles in al-Māturīdī’s metaphysics that cut all particular debates vertically. The basic principle of the al-Māturīdī’s metaphysics is based on this idea: God is a wise being, he does not do anything wise. Accordingly, it is absurd to create something to destroy; God did not create man to perish. The love of life and the fear of death are the deepest existential problems facing man as a finite being that goes towards death. Religion can be regarded as a powerful alternative to other worldviews to the extent that it provides a reasonable explanation for man’s deep concern about finitude. For al-Māturīdī, neither pessimistic understandings that emphasize only the fear of death nor hedonistic understandings that ignore death offer a reasonable solution. God created death as something that people fear the most and avoid, and life as something they love and desire. The testing of man is about being between the fear of death and the desire to live in the world. According to al-Māturīdī, this dilemma that man is facing also shows him the way out. If people do good and useful deeds because of their love for life, and avoid nonsense and ugly deeds because of their afraid of death, they can make their life eternal with their own efforts and escape from eternal/permanent death. The other Hanafī thinker, a philosopher of law Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī’s views on the meaning of death and life are parallel to Māturīdī's. According to al-Dabūsī, to test man, what God has placed in human nature is not only the soul and reason but also the spirit (al-nafs) and whim (al-hawa). While the spirit and whim invites man to the temporary by ignorance, it calls the soul and reason to the permanent by knowledge. The test for human beings is to choose between the temporary and the eternal life. For al-Dabūsī, man’s saving himself from falling into nothingness and gaining the eternal life depends on his use of reason. In other words, the reason binds human beings to life, and the whim leads them to nothingness. Drawing a parallel between reasoning and existence, ignorance and absence, Dabūsī defines the terms divine command and divine prohibition in a very original way. For him, the divine command is the things that must exist, and the divine prohibition is the things that must not exist. If the man helps exist the things that God wills to exist, he can make his own existence eternal. If the man helps exist the things that God does not will to exist, he puts himself into nothingness. Lastly, both for al-Māturīdī and al-Dabūsī, life is a divine grace bestowed on human being to gain eternal life through the good deeds he does at any moment. In short, reason is necessary in religion because its use is a preference of existence to non-existence. This metaphysical system, which sees goodness as a bridge from this finite world to heaven and eternity and makes a connection between faith and deeds on the ontological and ethical level is the essence of the worldview of the Hanafī-Māturīdī tradition. (shrink)

Platon zählt zu den einflussreichsten Philosophen aller Zeiten. Er beeinflusste maßgeblich Profil und Kanon der westlichen Philosophie. Die Kritik am sogenannten Platonismus wurde kontinuierlich von den Schwierigkeiten gespeist, die die Interpretation der philosophischen Schriften Platons bereitet. Gemeinhin wird er als rein rationaler Philosoph gesehen. Ein Philosoph war er in der Tat, ebenso jedoch ein Experte in der Annäherung an das Nicht-Rationale, unter anderem in Form von Mythen. So wurde er auch als "Mythenerfinder" und "Mythologe" bezeichnet. Platon war ein Visionär, der (...) es wagte, das Reich des Nicht-Rationalen auf systematische und disziplinierte Art zu erforschen. Insgesamt lässt sich Platons philosophisches Vorhaben als Streben nach einer umfassenden Sicht des organischen Ganzen klassifizieren. Der Ausdruck „Gestalt“ scheint die Ganzheit am ehesten zu beschreiben. Platon kann als prominentester und auch als letzter Repräsentant der antiken Philosophie angesehen werden, der die Entwicklung einer Gestalt-Philosophie anstrebte. Plato is one of the most influential philosophers of all time. He decisively shaped the profile and canon of western philosophy. Criticism of what has become known as Platonism has been continuously nourished by the difficulties of interpreting this philosopher's writings. Plato is commonly viewed as a purely rational philosopher. A philosopher he was indeed, but Plato was also an expert in approaching the non-rational, in the form of mythology among others. Plato has been called a "mythmaker" and a "mythologist". Plato was a visionary who dared to explore the realm of the non-rational in a systematic and disciplined way. In an overall comparison, Plato's philosophical enterprise strives for a comprehensive perspective on the organic whole. The expression "Gestalt" seems to come closest to describing the wholeness. Plato may be considered to be the most prominent representative of classical philosophy to develop a Gestalt philosophy and also the last to do so in antiquity. (shrink)